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Technology introduction on ships: the tension between safety and economic rationality 
Abstract 
This paper examines technology introduction on ships guided by three questions: 1) what drives 
technology introduction; 2) how seafarers are involved in the process; 3) what the consequences 
are in shipping. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews with ship managers 
and senior seafarer officers as well as a questionnaire study with seafarer officers. They reveal a 
discrepancy between the regulatory intention of technology introduction and the actual 
implementation process on ships. While the former is spurred by safety concerns, the latter is 
driven by economic rationality. This discrepancy makes technology a double edged sword in 
shipping. On the one hand, it plays an important role in improving safety, and on the other, it brings 
about work intensification and increased surveillance at workplace. 
Key words: fatigue; paperwork; shipping; technology; work intensification 
 
1. Introduction 
Shipping plays the central role in global trade by handling over 80% of the share by volume. As 
seaborne trade rapidly grows in tandem with world trade and world GDP, the maritime shipping 
industry finds itself in the forefront of several changes including in the adoption of various new 
technologies (see Table 1 for major technologies introduced on ships). In the last 20 years, in the 
navigation side, for instance, ships have been fitted with advanced technologies in global position 
fixing and anti-collision avoidance. Likewise, in the engineering side, ships are far more automated 
and offer greater direct control of the engine from the navigation deck; while in the cargo operation, 
increasingly there is more automation to achieve remote centralised monitoring and operation. 
Technology has also found its place in advancing communication between the ship and its shore-
based managerial counterpart by bringing the cost down and facilitating greater and more readily 
accessible forms of interaction. From the days of wireless transmission and waiting to interact till 
the ship calls a port, the industry now freely uses satellite technology and the ship is now easily 
reachable at the other end of the phone even when it is in the middle of an ocean. These 
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technologies help automate shipboard operations, and thus can be seen collectively as automation 
technology. 
Acronyms Full names 
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
AIS Automatic Identification System 
ECDIS Electronic Chart and Display Information System 
UMS Unattended (Unmanned) Machinery Space 
OWS Oily Water Separator 
 
Table 1. Technologies introduced on ships 
 
Shipboard technology adoption not only serves to improve efficiency and productivity by 
automating operations, but also is intended to help with safety management and pollution 
prevention. The shipping industry is highly safety critical as a failure of either a technological or 
a human kind resulting in an accident carries the risk of causing damage to property, loss of life 
and pollution with noticeable consequence. Hence, preservation of the environment and safety 
management are closely reliant on successful ship-board operations. When a piece of technology 
is implemented for improved ship-board operation it carries the promise of making shipboard 
operation safer and help prevent pollution (Lorange, 2001; Lyridis et al., 2005; Panayides, 2003).  
 
Despite the potential benefits, it is evident from maritime accident investigation reports that 
inadequate use of technology on ships is a common contributory factor to accidents (Tang et al. 
2013). In this context, a number of studies have been conducted to examine issues, such as training 
on shipboard technology (Bailey et al. 2008; Sampson and Tang 2016; Tang and Sampson 2017), 
seafarers’ perceptions of new technology (Alan 2009), and limitations of technology on ships 
(Lutzhoft and Dekker 2002). They revealed that while seafarers need skills and knowledge on 
operations and limitations of new technology, the industry in general is reluctant to invest in 
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training. These studies however took technology as pre-given and focussed on issues related to the 
post-implementation stage; and as a result, issues involved in the adoption stage and 
implementation processes remain to be explored. In this context, this paper takes a holistic 
approach, examining all the three stages of technology introduction on ships. More specifically, it 
explores three related questions: 1) what drives technology introduction; 2) how seafarers are 
involved in the process; 3) what the consequences are. Similar to the previous research, technology 
in this paper refers to automation technology on ships in general.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Technology introduction and safety  
This paper (and the three questions) builds on three bodies of literature on technology introduction. 
The first one focuses on the benefits of technology. In safety critical industries research evidence 
indicates safety benefits of new technology (Brenner et al. 2016; Parente and McCullough 2009). 
In aviation it has been reported that successful use of safety-enhancing technology has improved 
safety for human-centric interfaces along with airborne and ground-based systems (Darr, et al., 
2008). The National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan of the US Air Transport Systems (JPDO, 2004) 
claims that technology helped achieve safer practices and emphasises how technology helped in 
an integrated and systematic approach to safety risk management. Likewise, in the medical sector, 
increase in the application of information technology has improved safety of drug usage especially 
in reducing medication errors in hospitals (Bates, 2000). Bar coding of drugs, automated 
dispensing devices to ensure that a drug is dispensed to the correct patient and using computers to 
enter the drug requirement have all successfully assisted the medical practitioners. It has also been 
reported that computerised intervention in the anti-infective drugs management program improved 
quality of patient care as well as in the reduction of cost. By managing information on patients’ 
allergies and antibiotic-susceptibility mismatches, the use of technology has greatly reduced errors 
and improved the quality of patient care (Evans et al., 1998).  
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Despite the potential benefits, technology introduction is rarely problem free. Therefore, a second 
body of literature examines the introduction processes. It is pointed out that to achieve more 
successful implementation, technology should not be seen as merely an additional piece of 
hardware which independently affects work performance; rather, it is the interaction between 
social and organisational reality and technological factors that shapes how work is performed 
(Karltun et al. 2017; Noy et al. 2015). Several recent reviews of literature on health information 
technology (HIT) adoption (Cresswell and Sheikh 2013; Greenhalgh et al. 2017; Sligo et al. 2017) 
revealed a number of technological, social and organisational factors facilitating HIT 
implementation. In terms of technology itself, it should be fit for purpose and easy to use. A 
number of social factors are equally important, including technological competencies of users, 
personal and peer attitudes towards new technology, and the environment for peer learning. As the 
interaction between users and technology takes place in organisations, organisational factors are 
crucial, such as strong leadership, effective communication across the organisation, sufficient 
resources allocated to training and on-going help-desk support, involving users at all stages of 
implementation, and on-going evaluation and user feedback. More importantly, it is argued that 
the key for successful implementation is to ensure the fit between technical, social and 
organizational factors (Cresswell and Sheikh 2013; Sligo et al. 2017). 
 
Similar to the first body of literature, the third one also focuses on the impacts of technology. But 
it takes a critical approach to examine the consequences technology adoption on workers. It reveals 
that technology makes work increasingly routinised, mechanised, and automated, which in turn 
deskills workers and even replaces them (David and Dorn 2013; Frey and Osborne 2017). 
Furthermore, routinisation and automation reinforces management control of the labour process 
(Braverman 1974), and new information technology enables management to monitor the labour 
process in more detail (Fleming and Sturdy 2011; Bain and Taylor 2000; Bain et al. 2002). 
Technology also contributes to work intensification via various management techniques, such as 
scientific management in the past and lean production more recently (Bain and Taylor 2000; Bain 
et al. 2002; Carter et al. 2011; 2013; Green 2005). Lean production, for example, in theory aims 
to continuously improve efficiency and quality by eliminating wasteful time and processes; but in 
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practice it was found to increase both volume and pace of work, and consequently workers 
complained about increased work intensification and pressure (Carter et al. 2011; 2013).  
 
Technology introduction in shipping is similarly associated with work intensification as 
automation on ships led to reduction on manning levels (IMO 2001). For example, the average 
crew size of Australian merchant navy fleet was reduced from 35 in 1982 to 16 in 1994 (Morris 
and Donn 1997). At the same time, technological advances in cargo handling have made port 
turnaround time shorter. In one typical port, the data suggested that vessel berth time on average 
was reduced from 138.50 hours in 1970 to about 15.75 in 1998 (Kahveci 1999). Even though 
technology makes some ship operations less demanding, it can hardly replace manpower in 
berthing and un-berthing operations. The double reduction means that there are fewer people to do 
the same amount of work in less time, which inevitably results in work intensification and fatigue. 
While fatigue is an occupational health issue, it has serious consequences on safety and it is not 
uncommon that duty officers fell asleep (due to fatigue) while on watch which resulted in 
grounding accidents (Tang et al. 2013).  
 
Each of these three bodies of literature focuses on one aspect of technology introduction at 
workplace. Rather than incompatible, their differences in terms of focus, findings and implications 
reflect the widely acknowledged conflicts between safety and productivity at workplace (Carayon 
et al. 2015; Woods 2007). As Carayon et al. (2015) point out, ‘what is espoused by senior 
management in terms of safety priorities does not reflect how safety-productivity trade-off 
decisions are actually made in the normal course of operations.’ This conflict is strongly evident 
in the shipping industry (Xue et al. 2017; 2018). Arguably, it has impacts on technology 
introduction on ships, especially on the fit between technical, social and organizational factors. By 
examining the three stages of implantation, this paper will draw out these impacts and help develop 
a comprehensive understanding of issues related to technology introduction on ships.  
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Furthermore, while the second body of literature largely focuses on technological, social and 
organisational factors, it also acknowledges that external environments, such as regulations, 
policies and industrial norms, may also condition technology introduction (Carayon et al. 2015; 
Cresswell and Sheikh 2013; Sligo et al. 2017). Therefore, this paper also examines the role played 
by the industrial wide environment. The next sub-section provides a background of the industry.  
 
2.2 The global shipping industry 
Until around the late 1960s, the majority of ship-owners registered their ships in their home 
countries and employed local seafarers. As such the ship-owner, his or her ship and the seafarers 
sailing on it all had the same national identity. However, from the 1970s, as a consequence of 
deregulation and increased free-market capitalism, more and more ship-owners chose to register 
their ships in countries, such as Liberia, Panama, and Bahamas, known as the flags of convenience 
(FOC), which offered lucrative registration fees, minimal conditions for admission and 
comparatively relaxed regulatory standards (DeSombre, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, as FOC did not impose any restriction on the nationality of seafarers, the ship-owners 
increasingly employed low-wage seafarers from new labour-supply nations, such as East 
European, and East and South East Asian countries. These seafarers were employed on short-term 
contracts and the majority of them ‘worked on contracts covering a single voyage or tour of duty’ 
which was typically between five and twelve months. The arrangement also meant that the 
employers no longer had the obligation towards seafarers’ continuing employability (ILO 2001). 
 
In this way ship-owners consolidated their economic advantage by engaging in increased cross-
border activity and exploitation of various resources. Consequently, flagging out gave rise to a 
global seafarer market. As a result of this transition the industry also witnessed new types of ship 
owners who had little experience of managing ships which subsequently led to a growth in the 
independent third party ship management companies taking on the responsibility of asset 
management and looking after the day-to-day operational needs of the ships (ILO 2001). The 
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industry in its current form is deeply fragmented with over 70% of the ships registered under FOC 
and a similar percentage of seafarers employed from low-wage labour supply nations.  
  
3. Research methods 
The study started with semi-structured interviews with ship managers and seafarers in South Asian 
country. Three shipping organisations with different operation styles were involved (see table 2). 
The rationale for engaging with different types of operators was to determine if that had an 
influence in the implementation of technology. As argued by Stake (2000) organisations for 
research should be from the mainstream and not selected randomly – these three organisations 
reflected purposeful sampling which included a fair balance of the operating features in the three 
companies. 
 
  Company A Company B Company C 
Operation Local branch office of a 
globally operated 
3rd party shipping 
management company 
Local branch office of a 
privately held ship 
owning company based 
in 
Western Europe 
State owned shipping 
company – managing 
own and 3rd party ships 
Types of 
ships 
Tankers, bulk carriers, 
& general cargo ships 
Tankers only Tankers, bulk carriers, 
containers, passenger 
ships & offshore ships 
Number of 
ships 
Around 100 Around 50 Around 75 
Crew 
nationality 
Multi-national Multi-national National 
Interviewed 
managers 
5 3 4 
 
Table 2 Details of the organisations and participants in the qualitative study 
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Semi-structured interviews with the managers in their offices provided the opportunities to 
appreciate the underlying issues, such as the constraints and the influence, affecting their chosen 
procedure for implementation of technology. All participants were encouraged to share their views 
and operational experiences more widely and not limit the discussion to the core focus of 
technology implementation.  
 
Apart from the managers from the three companies, four serving senior captains and chief 
engineers were interviewed for their experiences of technology introduction in the industry. They 
offered a different perspective to complement that of the managers. These senior officers were not 
employees of any of these three companies, but all of them worked on tankers with advanced 
automation technology. The underlying rationale is that were they employees of any of these 
companies, the knowledge that the shore staff of their company were part of the same study might 
discourage them from expressing their views freely.  
 
The following were among the questions asked to the participants about their experiences: 
         What drives the technology implementation process? 
         How do you justify the cost of implementing technology? 
         Describe the role of the ship’s staff in the implementation process? 
         Is technology optimally implemented for improving safety of the ship and OHS of the 
staff? 
Each of the 16 interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and was digitally recorded with the 
permission of the participants. The interviews were transcribed and coded by the first author. 
Themes and their relationships were drawn out from the data by the first author in discussion with 
the second author (see Figure 1 for an overview of the relationships between themes). Similarities, 
inconsistencies and variances between views expressed by ship managers and those of seafaring 
staff were also examined.  
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Following on the themes drawn out of the interview data, a questionnaire was designed and 
administrated to seafarer officers, who were undertaking training courses in maritime colleges in 
India, Philippines, and the UK. The aim was to verify interview findings. Altogether, 134 
questionnaires were completed and returned. Sixty nine of the participants came from India, 44 
from Philippines, 11 from Vietnam, four from Spain and the rest from other countries. The 
participants either were junior officers, with watch keeping responsibilities on ships, such as the 
second officer, or were senior officers, such as the chief engineer with supervisory functions. 
 
The questionnaire asked 22 technology implementation related questions using Likert scale against 
each question, starting from Totally disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree to Strongly agree’ (see 
Appendix for the questionnaire). Due to the limited space of this paper, the responses to only a 
few of these questions were used to support the interview data. The research was conducted in 
compliance with the ethics guidelines and approved by the Faculty Research Ethical Approval 
Committee (FREAC), Faculty of Business (Ref. No. FREAC1213.51). All the research 
participants gave their informed consent. 
 
4. Results and discussions  
This section presents and discusses the results in relation to the three questions set out in the 
beginning. The first sub-section discusses the drivers of technology introduction, and the focus is 
on the adoption stage. The second sub-section focuses on the implementation process and 
discusses seafarers’ involvement in the process. The consequences of technology introduction are 
discussed in the third sub-section. Figure 1 shows the main themes and the flow of the discussion. 
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Figure 1. Relationships between themes 
4.1 The economics of technology introduction 
In the tanker trade a critical driver for adopting new technologies is the Oil Majors, which refers 
to major oil companies in the world, such as Shell, Texaco and Exxon. They dominate the oil 
supply chain from exploration and production of crude oil to refining, as well as to distribution of 
refined petroleum products. Although it is a vertically integrated supply chain, some of its elements 
including the maritime transportation are outsourced. However, as Oil Majors remain implicitly 
associated with the ship which carries its cargo, they take active interest in the operating and safety 
standards of ships they hire and in the shipping companies where the ships are managed. This is 
because shipboard incidents have the potential to bring them to disrepute and likely to result in 
their wider economic loss. Thus, Oil Majors lay their own operating standards and before 
employing a ship they conduct rigorous vetting to determine the physical state of the ship as well 
as its operating practice against such standards. Their special requirements often include the use 
of new technology on ships which are over and above the regulatory requirements. Thus, for a 
higher charter fees the shipping companies which trade oil major cargo invest higher than the 
globally acceptable minimum standards (see Bhattacharya and Tang 2013; Tang and Bhattacharya 
2018). 
Causal factors: 
Regulations 
Oil Majors 
E.H.S 
 
 
Economic context: 
Freight market 
Regulatory uncertainty 
Cost of technology 
 
Action: 
Adoption 
 
Non-adoption 
Consequences: 
Safety improvement 
Crew reduction 
Paperwork 
Fatigue 
Monitoring 
 
 
Poor implementation 
Seafarers’ involvement 
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Other than the prescribed demands from the Oil Majors, the uptake of technology is left to a 
combination of push factors from the regulators and the discretion of the ship owners to do so 
voluntarily. New regulations are developed through deliberation at the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) by individual States and industry stakeholders. The most common influencing 
factor for any such new regulation is to improve maritime safety. The IMO has the aim to 
implement new regulations uniformly across the industry so that a common platform is established 
for ships sailing to all corners of the world to have a minimum threshold of safe operation. 
However, it also means that such regulations come into effect after lengthy negotiations 
between flag States and industry stakeholders and are aimed at the level which is realistically 
achievable by the states which have relatively weak infrastructures. The IMO led regulations thus 
draw criticism for being slow and offering only a step change in particular to technology uptake 
(Roe 2013). 
 
The process provides ship owners the opportunity to voluntarily adopt technology before the 
regulatory deadline and offers flexibility to choose how to implement it. The reality, however, is 
that safety consideration, which is the underpinning objective of bringing in new technology to 
ships, is replaced by an economic justification. The most predominant sentiment from the 
managers’ perspective is the challenge to justify adoption of technology for enhancing safety 
which is not duly supported by an economic rationale. This understanding was shared among all 
three companies. Despite the differences in their management styles, adoption of technology for 
improving safety alone was not a strong enough justification. A manager from Company A 
expressed: 
Progress however gets hampered by the question of ‘who should pay’ for these investments 
and there was a need to provide evidence of payback from innovations. 
  
The problem of who should pay, however, was not a concern when the technology was demanded 
by the Oil Majors. It was because their chartering fees were adequate to pay for the investments. 
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As all organisations operated tankers, this view was common across all three of them. One manager 
from Company C, for instance, said: 
Oil Majors… if they require a piece of technology to be installed then of course we don’t 
have to think twice – this is different you see… then we know we have to and no one needs 
convincing. 
  
When Oil Majors are not involved, however, the reality is different. The volatility of the shipping 
market involving a range of uncertainties makes it even more difficult for the ship owners to judge 
the market and make an investment (Lorange 2001). While they are willing to adopt new 
technology, an economic analysis of the cost of implementing any new piece of technology is seen 
as a prerequisite. When regulation is not driving the technology the matter gets even harder. One 
manager from Company B explained: 
Regulatory changes were not always clear and industry generally is anxious not to be 
taken down ‘a blind alley’… now unless there is regulatory directive towards new 
technology voluntary investment is very difficult to justify. 
  
It is a popular saying that ‘safety pays’. According to this logic, if technology helps with 
management of workplace health and safety and environment, then it pays back in the long run. In 
practice, however, such message tends to be treated as merely a slogan and appears unable to 
convince ship managers. One ship captain, for example, said: 
With the kind of awareness generated, it is today a well-known fact that what is good for 
EHS [Environment, Health and Safety] is good for business and vice versa, although 
returns may be not as tangible for companies to voluntarily adopt technologies contributing 
to it… There is where we fail to convince our managers on how important new technology 
is. 
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The structure of the industry in part plays a major role here. Flagging out has for years encouraged 
ship owners to cut costs by opting for lower registration fees and tax, more relaxed regulatory 
requirements, and cheaper seafaring labour from the global market. Such cost cutting measures 
inevitably led to lower quality of ships and particularly to the less scrupulous ship-owners an 
important competitive edge. This edge puts pressure on those who operate higher quality ships 
with higher operating costs, especially when the shipping market experiences crisis and freight 
rates go down. Meanwhile, cost cutting allows low quality ships to survive and delays the 
elimination of substandard tonnage, which in turn makes oversupply of tonnage an issue difficult 
to solve and further depresses freight rates (ILO 2001). Thus, there is a vicious circle of cost cutting 
in the industry facilitated by the structural change. But fortunately a few pieces of regulations 
adopted at the IMO in the 1990s to improve safety records and a series of regulatory enforcement 
mechanisms, such as Port State Control (PSC), have combatted substandard ships (ILO 2001; 
DeSombre 2006), and this vicious circle has not resulted in a race to the bottom. It provides no 
incentive for a race to the top either, and as a result staying in the middle became the commonplace 
(DeSombre 2006; 2008). Staying in the middle means that any initiative to raise standard may lead 
to a disadvantage in the competition. While substandard ships operating at the lowest possible 
costs would be targeted for inspection and thus penalised, keeping costs at or slightly below an 
average level is safe and remains important for survival. 
 
In the light that the fierce global competition and the volatile freight market make future less 
predictable and more uncertain, it seems difficult to maintain a long-term view in the industry and 
ship managers and owners tend to pursue short-term returns and cost cutting. Thus, it is not 
surprising that despite the differences between the three companies, they were remarkably similar 
in taking no initiatives in investing in and adopting technology voluntarily. Unsurprisingly, 
according to the questionnaire data (see Table 3), more than half (50.8 per cent) either agreed or 
strongly agreed that ‘economic logic of low cost operation underpins every aspect of technology 
integration’. 
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  Totally 
Disagree/Disagree 
Neutral Strongly 
Agree/Agree 
Economic logic of low cost operation 
underpins every aspect of technology 
integration 12.5% 36.7% 50.8% 
Implementation of technology leads to 
downsizing of crew 23% 26% 55% 
The ship staffs are consulted for the 
design, operational constraint or 
impact of new technology 43% 22% 35% 
The seafarers on the ship directly 
influenced technology implementation 40% 27% 32% 
Shipboard paperwork has reduced due 
to technology implementation 49% 14% 36% 
On current (last) ship Technology was 
complex and confusing 4% 13% 83% 
Communication technology helps the 
managers monitor the ships more than 
it benefits the seafarers 
11% 22% 67% 
 
Table 3. Impacts of implementing technology on shipboard operation (n= 134)  
 
4.2 Poorly planned implementation 
As ship owners found it hard to justify investment in technology it remained largely driven by 
external forces such as pressure from powerful business clients and regulatory mandates. The 
enforced nature of introduction provoked reluctance which was reflected by the common practice 
of leaving it to the last minute, as one manager from Company C mentioned: 
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Early planning for effective induction of new technology is important… Leaving it to the 
last moment is another well-trodden path within our industry… but that’s how ship owners 
operate. 
  
Research evidence suggests that when new technology is introduced, comprehensive integration 
of human operators starting from the definition and early stages of design to development and 
evaluation in the use of technology should be considered for its optimal use (Cresswell and Sheikh 
2013; Karltun et al. 2017; Noy et al. 2015). It points out the importance of giving greater 
consideration for the capacity, limitations and needs of the operators and the environment they 
work in as well as their aptitude, skills, training in the use of the technology, and the impacts it 
may have in their safety and health at workplace. Similarly, studies in the shipping industry have 
also identified the need for better coordination between humans and machines (Lutzhoft and 
Dekker 2002) and adequate training for operators (Allen 2009) for a more fruitful implementation. 
 
The ship managers interviewed were aware of these concerns, despite the prevalent practice of 
leaving to the last minute. They also held the opinion that comprehensive and early planning 
involving managers and seafarers in the initial introduction of new technology and in training of 
end-users would be ideal for effective implementation. One Company C manager said: 
Firstly planning is the key. Understanding the ship’s staff, their capabilities, their needs, 
aspiration and complete familiarisation helps… even simple things such as where should 
the new piece of technology be installed or where should the display unit be located in the 
bridge should be inquired from the users. 
  
The focus on short-term economic returns, however, is not compatible with early and careful 
planning. The seafarers in their interviews expressed lack of involvement in any of the stages 
leading to the implementation of technology on ships. They revealed that the practice was to add 
automation as and when it was pressurised by the commercial players or became mandatory as per 
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statute. Such changes were typically brought in when the ship was in for routine maintenance and 
seafarers were required to learn the operation quickly and adapt to it. One chief engineer explained: 
We are constantly adapting to the newest technology. No one asks us of what technology 
should be invested in or discusses whether a technology is relevant to the design of the 
ships… every now and then there is either a new technology or a new model that the 
managers decide to install.  
Similarly, one captain stated in the interview: 
Seafarers have no choice but to cope with the situations of given technology, as they are 
bound to deliver on ship’s performance. 
  
Thus, for seafarers, technology is pre-given and their involvement in the implementation is to 
accept and cope with it. It was not just the seafarers’ views, the lack of seafarers’ involvement was 
all too well known to the managers in the three companies, despite the organisational differences. 
One of them from Company A, for example, candidly commented: 
I am not convinced that with the introduction of all of the technologies over the decades 
ships have become any safer. We can keep blaming the new generation of officers on 
relying too much on technology or failing to use the technology properly but the truth is 
that by adding non-standardised technology often without consulting the seafarers or 
without giving them adequate training we may have caused them more harm than good. 
According to the questionnaire data (see Table 3), 43 per cent of the respondents totally disagreed 
or disagreed with the statement that ‘The ship staffs were consulted for the design, operational 
constraint or impact of new technology’, and 40 per cent totally disagreed or disagreed with the 
statement that ‘The seafarers on the ship directly influenced technology implementation’. 
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4.3 Demanding technology 
While seafarers in their interviews acknowledged a few benefits of using technology, such as safer 
navigation under adverse weather which would have been far more challenging otherwise and 
faster and more convenient communication leading to quicker dispatching of stores, they expressed 
overwhelming concerns with the ‘ruthless reduction of manpower’ on ships and the issue of work 
intensification and fatigue caused by it. While the interviewees showed their awareness of the 
deterring cost of seafarers’ salaries and the trend in the industry towards downsizing, they were of 
the view that ‘proper’ use of technology could benefit them as users and could offer a solution to 
the concerns of work intensification and fatigue. However, the interviews further revealed that in 
reality instead of contributing to safer and simpler operations, new technology introduction made 
work on-board more demanding. 
  
Since economic considerations take the central stage and safety recedes to the background in the 
technology introduction process, none of the managers made reference to seafarers when talking 
about driving forces of technology introduction. They, however, mentioned the need for reduction 
in crew size as an inevitable outcome because the cost of the expensive technology had to be 
recovered. One of the senior managers in Company A expressed candidly: 
Each piece of technology is expensive and comes with a promise of cost reduction and 
efficiency…no sooner than GMDSS was installed the ship-owners got rid of the radio 
operators. But in reality the radio operators did a lot more than sending and receiving 
messages. But saving an officer’s salary for 12 months was as though the precondition for 
installing the system. Now the Master is required to do all that… the ship is not necessarily 
any safer, but who cares? 
 Surely, this happen not only to Company A; the position of radio officer/operator on ships has 
been removed in the whole industry as a result of GMDSS introduction.  
 
Seafarers too offered some scathing remarks on downsizing as after all it was they who had to bear 
the brunt of the reduction in shipboard manning. Some even suggested that implementation of 
 
 
19 
 
technology was in fact a ploy to reduce the expenses on manpower. A Chief Engineer articulated 
this point of view and argued: 
Regarding the highest cost to ship owners being crew wages...they are not the highest 
operating cost, but they are the highest discretionary cost. In other words, ship repair, dry-
docking, fuel, etc. are all non-discretionary costs because they are overhead costs that are 
outside the ship owners’ area of control. They can't make the ships use less fuel, but they 
can cut the number of crew on-board and still make it to their destination. 
  
The questionnaire data (see Table 3) also indicated a similar result in which 53 per cent either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the view that downsizing on ships was a result of technology 
addition. 
 
Another concern seafarers pointed out is related to paperwork. It is a common complaint in the 
industry that the amount of paperwork has increasingly become a heavy burden for seafarers 
(Knudsen 2009). In shipping, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) 
Report (2005) strongly suggests that on-board information and communication technology (ICT) 
developments hold the potential to increase efficiency and reduce administrative burden thus 
relieving seafarers from, for example, filling forms and logbooks by recording and transmitting 
real-time operational data to the management office and making the industry safer. However, 
around half of the serving seafarers in the questionnaire study disagreed or totally disagreed that 
by introducing technology, paperwork on board had reduced. 
 
Seafarers in the interviews complained that technology that could help reduce paperwork burden 
had not been considered in the industry and expressed the hope that one day introduction of such 
technology on-board would become a reality, as one seafarer mentioned: 
We have not seen any reduction in the paperwork despite the increasing application of 
technology on ships… the maritime industry should be encouraged to widely adopt 
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electronic data storage and get rid of the paper burden whenever possible.  [Hopefully] it 
should be a matter of time that there is common acceptance of electronic checklists. 
  
At the current stage, however, rather than reducing paperwork, introduction of new technology 
served to increase it. Seafarers explained the practices of duplicate log keeping which required 
watch-keeping officers to manually enter data to one or more logbooks from the readouts of 
shipboard machines and instruments. They complained that the time saved by having an extra 
instrument for more efficient ship operation was lost due to the additional workload it generated. 
A captain, for instance, said in his interview: 
On the bridge we still spend half of the time filling in logbooks and sheets which need 
meticulous filing at the end of the day. Often we are merely noting information from the 
instruments and machines to prove that we are monitoring them. Surely, the intention of 
the use of technology was not to disturb the [watch-keepers from keeping an uninterrupted] 
lookout. 
  
A Chief Engineer likewise expressed: 
P&I Clubs are reporting growing number of accidents in which fatigue was identified as a 
major contributor. There is a need to ‘work smarter’, perhaps through task analysis that 
will assess the optimum manpower needed for tasks and voyages… but the current 
practices of technology use are not relieving our tasks. They are only adding to it. 
  
Over the last three decades emails and phone calls as means of communication between a ship and 
its management office have become relatively inexpensive and thus resulted in increased and more 
frequent information exchange between the ship and the shore. Such convenience brought about 
by technological development ironically also serves to add seafarers’ workload, as managers 
ashore demand for more and more information from ships. In the interviews the officers shared 
their disapproval because of the demands made by the managers to convey operational data, such 
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as the details of fuel consumption or ship’s location and maintenance reports from the ships, as 
one captain put it: 
There is so much time and effort being taken up in this process of ‘Monitoring of fuel 
consumption and vessel performance’. There are daily reports, weekly reports, monthly 
reports, quarterly reports, half-yearly reports besides the special reporting that are not at 
fixed intervals. The Master today is not the captain anymore, he is a clerk. 
  
At the other end, the managers were aware of seafarers concerns but justified the increasing 
demand for information by expressing the need for keeping a better check on their seafaring 
colleagues. They were keen to use the technology to monitor what went on their fleet. One manager 
in Company A, for instance, said: 
In the backdrop of popular crewing policies and the basic education and training 
infrastructure in non-established countries that supply most seafarers, this [seafarers 
working more independently] was impossible. Without the right tools, we cannot expect 
our people to make difficult management decisions… we have to monitor them, guide them 
and talk to them on the phone every now and then. 
  
The data seem to suggest a process of deskilling as managers made the decisions while ships’ staffs 
were required to pass on relevant information. This, however, was not the only interpretation, as 
interviews with seafarers revealed their claim that the managers were using new communication 
technologies primarily to control the activities of the shipboard staff but were not prepared to 
assume more responsibility. One captain pointed out: 
The Captains still have to take all the tough decisions as they are on the spot; the managers 
would never take any responsibility… they would only call and ask questions but back off 
when things get tough. 
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As such, seafarers did not welcome such monitoring and interfering in the management of 
shipboard operation. After all, it increases their workload without reducing their responsibility. In 
their perception ICT had deprived them of their freedoms of being independent at sea. One captain 
said: 
While ICT has made it cheaper to call our families the superintendents use the same 
technology to play Big Brother by calling ships several times in a week… calling up for 
ETA [estimated time of arrival], asking questions on requisition orders sent form ships, 
asking about progress in the maintenance and hundreds more. 
  
In the same way, the questionnaire data showed that two out of every three seafarers either agreed 
or strongly agreed that on board ICT was used more for surveillance purpose compared with the 
benefit it brought to the seafarers. 
 
Clearly, seafarers disapproved such technology-led control as they have traditionally been rather 
independent from the time the ship left the harbour. In part, the disparity between the two 
perspectives reflects a poor level of mutual respect, understanding and trust. Such distrust, as the 
manager’s word above implied, is rooted in crewing policies which is characterised by short-term 
employment. The major point here is that for seafarers, the introduction of ICT facilities did not 
take away any of their responsibilities but instead made managers more demanding on them. 
  
Furthermore, seafarers in the interviews expressed that managers’ demand could actually be 
satisfied by technology easily, as one chief engineer suggested: 
If we have to operate with so few [crew], we must concentrate only on the core operational 
activities. The tasks that involve reporting the mere volume, temperature, pressure and 
things like speed and location should be automatically transmitted without us having to 
bother. 
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However, such technology is not yet in demand. Without regulation, initiating introduction of such 
technology to spare seafarers from time-consuming and tedious clerical tasks of reporting activities 
would be hard to justify as the prevalent focus in the industry on short-term economic returns is 
far too ingrained. 
  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the three stages of technology introduction on ships guided by three research 
questions. It shows that the main drivers of technology adoption in shipping are the Oil Majors 
and IMO regulations. Out of economic considerations and due to competition pressures, voluntary 
technology adoption to improve safety is rare. In order to reduce costs, the implementation of new 
technology is often rushed without adequate planning. As a result, users – seafarers – are not 
consulted in the process, training is haphazard and user feedback is not sought and concerns not 
addressed. Although new technology does bring some safety and operational benefits, it 
nevertheless creates additional but unnecessary paperwork which sometimes makes seafarers 
fatigued. It also results in reduction in crew sizes and increased workplace surveillance.  
 
Thus it is fair to say that new technology introduction on ships has not been successfully integrated 
into the work process. Underpinning this outcome is the tension between (long-term) safety and 
(short-term) economic gains at workplace (Carayon et al. 2015; Woods 2007). While the 
technology introduction is driven by regulatory mandates and powerful clients for the purpose of 
improving safety and protecting the marine environment, the implementation process is driven by 
economic logic of low cost operations with safety concerns being pushed aside. Such discrepancy 
between the regulatory intention of technology introduction and the actual implementation process 
on ships means that while technology helps, the benefit is undermined by new problems. In theory, 
new technology holds potentials to lessen seafarers’ stress and fatigue, but in practice they 
contribute to it by making users adapt to the new technology without alleviating their manual tasks.  
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Despite the differences between the three companies involved in this study, they are similar in 
their approaches to technology introduction. This is largely due to the globalisation of the shipping 
industry, which means the companies are regulated by the same regulatory agencies and compete 
with each other directly in the global market for freight. Even though Company C, a state-owned 
national company, employs national seafarers only, this crewing policy does not give it any 
advantage over the other two companies who use a multi-national crew, because this South Asian 
country is a major cheap seafarer labour supplier. The three companies converge in their 
competitive strategy which is cost reduction. In fact, cost reduction is the prevailing competitive 
strategy in the shipping industry (Ferfeli 2009; ILO 2001). This strategy contributes to the 
(over)emphasis on short-term economic gains at the cost of long-term safety benefits.  
 
The logical way to resolve the tension between economic gains and safety is to make the principle 
– safety pays – work. However, it remains a challenge as the global structure of the shipping 
industry and its cost-cutting based competition forces shipping companies to prioritise short-term 
economic gains. This challenge also reveals that factors affecting technology implementation often 
go beyond the level of organisation.  
 
As this paper focuses on three companies from a single nation, it has limitations. While the findings 
serve to highlight a number of issues, some other issues may not surface in this study. Further work 
is needed to examine technology introduction on ships in other contexts in order to develop a more 
nuanced and fuller picture.  
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Appendix: Technology Implementation on Ships Questionnaire 
7 
Economic logic of low cost 
operation underpins every aspect 
of technology integration.  
 
8 
Only minimum compliance to 
technology is sought that is 
pushed through regulations. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
9 
The ship staffs are consulted for 
the design, operational constraint 
or impact of new technology. 
10 
Design is led by technology and 
its commercial exploitation rather 
than to meet user needs. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
11 
The flag of the ship directly 
influences the standard of 
technology implementation. 
12 
The owner of the ship directly 
influences the standard of 
technology implementation. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
13 
The Tech Manager of the ship 
directly influences the standard 
of technology implementation. 
14 
The seafarers on the ship directly 
influence the standard of 
technology implementation. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
 
 
5 Is your Tech Manager the 6 Is your Crew Manager the 
 Ship Owner ⃝  Ship Owner ⃝ 
 3rd Party ⃝  
Tech Manager ⃝ 
3rd Party ⃝ 
 
Other (Please specify): 
 
 
    
1 What is your job title?  
2 Which company do you work for?  
3 
How long have you been working in 
this (a) company, (b) rank 
(a) (b) 
4 How old are you years 
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15 
Tech/Equipment on ships are non-
standardized resulting in confusion 
and information clutter. 
16 
For ease of operation, Technology 
on ships should be simpler to use. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
17 
Tech/Equipment use helps me 
overcome work-related fatigue. 
18 
Tech/Equipment use helps me 
overcome work-related stress. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
19 
Technology has made the watch-
keepers’ task easier 
20 
Implementation of Tech/Equipment 
leads to downsizing of crew. 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
21 
Crew feedback on technology design/ 
operation is taken seriously 
22 
On current (last) ship man-power 
was suitably replaced by 
technology 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
23 
On current (last) ship Technology 
was complex and confusing 
24 
Communication Technology helps the 
Managers monitor the ships more 
than it benefits the seafarers 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
25 
Shipboard paperwork has reduced due 
to the implementation of Technology 
26 
Crew are given adequate training 
on technology that are used on 
ships 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
 
Totally 
disagree 
   
Strongly 
agree 
            
  
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
   
1 
⃝ 
2 
⃝ 
3 
⃝ 
4 
⃝ 
5 
⃝ 
 
27 Please express in a few words your personal experience with Ship Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
